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Evidence - Presumptions - Application of the Deadly Weapons
Presumption in West Virginia
Presumptions, as used by the courts, are among the most basic
elements in the guilt-determining process. Presumptions aid the parties
in proving their case and the jury in reaching its decision. Un-
fortunately the deadly weapons presumption as it presently operates
in West Virginia is an area of confusion.
When a homicide is committed with a deadly weapon' in West
Virginia it is presumed to be murder in the second degree. The deadly
weapons presumption provides the element of malice necessary for a
second degree murder conviction by permitting the inference of malice
from the use of a deadly weapon.2 In the words of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, "the real intent and purpose of the slayer
I W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 7, § 1 (Michie 1966), proscribes the carrying
about the person of certain enumerated instruments that are dangerous or
deadly weapons per se. In Barboursville v. Taylor, 115 W. Va. 4, 7-8, 174 SE.
485, 486 (1934), the court considered implements used as weapons that are
not enumerated as dangerous or deadly per se:
Whether an implement used in a homicide or an assault was a
dangerous or deadly weapon may be a question of fact for jury deter-
mination ....
A weapon that has caused death may be regarded as a deadly
weapon when employed in the manner in which it was used when the
homicide was produced. By the same manner, a weapon which has in-
ficted serious bodily injury may be deemed dangerous when employed
in the manner in which it was used when the injury was inflicted.
But though a weapon may be dangerous when used in a certain
manner, it may not be dangerous when such manner of use is avoided.
(citations omitted).
2 State v. Hamric, 151 W. Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1966), commented on
in 69 W. VA. L. RPv. 361 (1967). A shot B through the window of A's house.
A alleged that she thought she was in danger of great bodily harm. At the time
of the shooting B was on his own property and was not trying to enter A's
house. There was evidence from which it could be inferred that A knew whom
she was shooting. State ex rel. Combs v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d
115 (1966). A shot and killed his uncle, after which he loaded the body with
rocks and dumped it into a well. State v. Bowyer, 143 W. Va. 302, 101 S.E.2d
243 (1957). A shot B during an affray provoked by B. State v. Toler, 129
W. Va. 575, 41 S.E.2d 850 (1946). During a quarrel between A and B, B
attempted to get A out of her house with the aid of C. C left and returned
about thirty minutes later with a gun. C met A on the porch and after some
loud talking and a command to "stand back," C shot A. See also State v. Boggs,
129 W. Va. 603, 42 SE.2d 1 (1946); State v. Jones, 128 W. Va. 496, 37 SE.2d
103 (1946); State v. Bowles, 117 W. Va. 217, 185 SE. 205 (1936); State v.
Shelton, 116 W. Va. 75, 178 SE. 633 (1935); State v. Sauls, 97 W. Va. 184,
124 SE. 670 (1924); State v. Whitt, 96 W. Va. 268, 122 S.E. 742 (1924);
State v. Roush, 95 W. Va. 132, 120 S.E. 304 (1923); State v. Galford, 87 W.
Va. 358, 105 S.E. 237 (1920); State v. Panetta, 85 W. Va. 212, 101 S.E. 360
(1919); State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S.E. 204 (1902).
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is established by inference from the means by which, and the circum-
stances under which, he effected the killing."3
The deadly weapons presumption places upon the defendant the
burden of going forward with evidence that tends to prove justifica-
tion or mitigating circumstances, to reduce the homicide to voluntary
manslaughter.4 To raise the homicide to first degree murder the prose-
cution must prove that the homicide was committed with premedita-
tion and deliberation.5
The element provided by the deadly weapons presumption, which
raises a homicide to murder, is malice. 6 Although a precise definition
of "malice" may be impossible, it has been described as an attitude of
reckless disregard for human life,7 and "an action flowing from a
wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact
has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain
implications of a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief."8 As a legal term of art, "malice" is used to indicate the
required criminal intent necessary to sustain a charge of murder, and
it represents the intentional commission of a wrongful act without
provocation or justification.9
The use of the term "malice" is the source of much confusion
because of the difficulty that arises in separating the legal from the
non-legal meanings of the word.'0 To the jury, "malice" tends to indl-
3 State v. Gravely, 66 W. Va. 375, 383, 66 S.E. 503, 507 (1909) (Poffen-
barger, J. dissenting in part).4 State v. Hanric, 151 W. Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1966).
5Id. In State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679, 709-10 (1882), the court held that
from the use of a deadly weapon premeditation and deliberation may be
presumed. Whether it is proper to instruct the jury that it may find premedita-
tion and deliberation from the use of a deadly weapon is now held to depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Bowles, 117 W. Va. 217,
221, 185 SM. 205, 208 (1936).
W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1966) provides: "Murder by
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any wilful, deliberate and
premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson,
rape, robbery or burglary, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is
murder of the second degree." This statute does not displace the common law
elements of murder, it merely defines the degrees of murder.6 State v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 194, 151 SE.2d 115 (1966); State v. Lewis,
133 W. Va. 584, 57 SE.2d 513 (1949); State v. Thornhill, 111 W. Va. 258, 161
SE. 431 (1931); State v. Laura, 93 W. Va. 250, 116 S.E. 251 (1923); State v.
Galford, 87 W. Va. 358, 105 SE. 237 (1920); State v. Weisengoff, 85 W. Va.
271, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
7 State v. Saunders, 108 W. Va. 148, 150 S.E. 519 (1929).8 State v. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297, 299 (1886).
9 State v. Gunter, 123 W. Va. 569, 17 S.E.2d 46 (1941). See also Note,
The Language of Murder, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306 (1967).0WEBs' r'S NEW INTawATiONAL DianoNARY 1489 (2d ed. 1955), de-
fines malice as badness, harmfulness, enmity of heart, malevolence, and ill will.
[Vol. 75
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cate that there must have existed some ill-will or evil feeling within
the mind of the accused;" but, "malice," as an element of murder,
may exist without the presence of ill-will or evil feeling within the
mind of the accused.' 2 Much of the confusion generated by the use of
this term may be eliminated by the deadly weapons presumption.
In general, a presumption is a "legal mechanism, which, unless
sufficient evidence is introduced to render the presumption inopera-
tive, deems one fact to be true when the truth of another fact has been
established."'' 3 The deadly weapons presumption establishes the exis-
tence of malice by inference when the evidence indicates the homicide
was committed with a deadly weapon. Although the operation of this
presumption appears simple in the abstract, its application raises
serious practical questions. The most important is the function it
serves within the normal guilt-determining process.' 4
The Thayerian view of presumptions declares that if sufficient
evidence is introduced that would justify a finding of fact contrary to
the fact assumed by operation of the presumption, the case must be
decided by the trier of fact as if the presumption never existed. The
presumption is considered to be rebutted.'5 The effect of the presump-
tion is to place upon the defendant the burden of producing evidence
that would justify a finding contrary to the fact assumed.' 6 It should
be noted that the jury learns of the presumption only through the
court's instruction given at the conclusion of the evidence. Under the
Thayerian view the jury receives such instructions only if the de-
fendant has failed to rebut the presumption. If found insufficient to
rebut the presumption, the evidence introduced for that purpose will
still be considered, as will the presumption, by the jury in determining
the ultimate issue - that of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
"1R. PERKINs, CRnnmuAL LAw 49 (2d ed. 1969). See also Pike, What Is
Second Degree Murder in California, 9 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 112 (1936); Note, The
Language of Murder, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1306 (1967).
'2 Note, Degrees of Murder and Manslaughter, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 194
(1938).
'3 Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J 165 (1969). An accepted
and more classical definition can be found in 9 J. WiGMoRE, EVDENCE § 2491
(3d ed. 1940), and C. McCoRmvcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVDENCE 806
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
14 Application of the same presumption can produce quite different results
when different interpretations are employed. J. THAYER, PRELMNmARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 337 (1898), and E. MORGAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
33-35 (1954), present the two most widely known views.
Is J. Thayer, supra note 14, at 337.
'6 The burden of producing evidence is the burden on a party to produce
evidence that would justify the trier of fact in finding the existence of the fact
or issue. C. McCoRmicK, supra note 13, at 783-85.
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Regardless if the defendant produces evidence in rebuttal, the
burden of persuasion 7 should remain with the party who initially
asserts the truth of the fact or-issue. 8 In a murder trial, both the
burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence initially
rest on the prosecution. By using the presumption, the burden of
producing evidence to rebut the presumption of malice shifts to the
defendant while, ideally, the burden of persuasion remains on the
prosecution.' 9
If the defendant meets his burden of producing evidence, suffi-
cient to warrant a jury finding of no malice, 0 the presumption drops
out of the case. As one jurist described this operation in metaphor,
"[piresumptions may be looked on as bats of the law flitting in the
twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual fact."'" No in-
struction concerning the presumption is given to the jury. The jury is
never aware that a presumption once existed, because the court has
determined that the defendant has met his burden of going forward
with the evidence. The jury carries out its traditional function of
weighing the sufficiency of the evidence presented without the aid of
the presumption, and no specific comment is made concerning the
weight to be given the use of the deadly weapon. If the court has
determined that defendant did not introduce sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, the jury is instructed that from the use of a
deadly weapon it may infer malice.
2
,7 The burden of persuasion is the duty to convince the trier of fact of the
truth of the facts or issues as alleged from the evidence submitted. C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 13, at 783-85.
8 E. MORGAN, BAsic PROBLEMS OF EVmENCE 33-35 (1954). Unlike Thayer,
Morgan asserts that both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
persuasion should shift to the opponent of the presumption once evidence is
introduced to support the presumption.
19 See generally C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 13, at 783-835; 9 J. WioMonn,
supra note 13, §§ 2483-98; MODEL CODE OF EViDENCE, rule 1(2), (3) (1942).
20Payne v. Ace House Movers, Inc., 145 W. Va. 86, 112 S.E.2d 449
(1960); State v. Freeport Coal Co., 144 W. Va. 178, 107 S.E.2d 503 (1959);
Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W. Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953); Lambert v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 123 W. Va. 547, 17 S.E.2d 628 (1941).
21 Mockowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.L, 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W.
256, 262 (1906) (Lamm, J.).
22 Although a presumption is mandatory in the classical sense, it is in-
appropriate to bind the jury by a mandatory presumption concerning the use
of a deadly weapon. The result would be to restrict the jury in its traditionally
uninhibited function of fact finding in criminal cases. In civil cases the court
may direct a verdict on the basis of an unrebutted presumption because the
presumption is mandatory; but no one would argue that the court should direct
a verdict against the defendant in a criminal case. Likewise, the court should
not bind the jury by a mandatory instruction.
For an interesting discussion on the constitutionality of presumptions, see
[Vol. 75
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For instance, if the prosecution shows that the defendant shot
the deceased during an argument, the burden of producing evidence
shifts to the defendant. To rebut the presumption of malice, the de-
fendant must present evidence tending to show mitigation or justifica-
tion. Thus, if the defendant presents sufficient evidence tending to
show that he shot the deceased in self defense, the presumption is
rebutted. No instruction is given that permits the jury to infer malice
from the use of the deadly weapon, and the jury is never aware of
the shifting burden. Without the aid of a presumption, the jury must
determine the existence or non-existence of malice solely from the
evidence presented. Conversely, if the defendant's evidence is insuffi-
cient to warrant a finding of self defense or other justification or miti-
gation, the presumption is not rebutted, and the jury is instructed that
it may infer malice from the use of the deadly weapon. In either case,
during the presentation of the evidence the jury is unaware that the
burden of going forward with the evidence has shifted.
In accordance with the general law of presumptions, the right of
the court in West Virginia to instruct the jury that it may infer malice
from the use of a deadly weapon is not unbridled. All homicides with
a deadly weapon are not murder.23 Even if no provocation or justifica-
tion is shown, the facts and circumstances of a case may indicate that
the presumption of malice is unwarranted. The act, the means, and
the circumstances of each case must be considered before a presump-
tion of malice is warranted from the use of a deadly weapon. Con-
sequently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has indicated
that even if there is no adequate provocation in the eyes of the law,
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 13. The authors suggest that constitutional
arguments can be made on the following grounds:
1. As to the element which is presumed from the elements proved,
the defendant no longer enjoys any benefits from the "presumption"
(more properly "assumption") of innocence. In practical effect, al-
though not technically, he is no longer assumed innocent ....
2. The defendant is no longer provided a jury trial upon the element
presumed, inasmuch as he is deprived of the untrammeled response
of the jury as to that element.
3. Since the determination of the presumed element is automatic, the
defendant is denied a trial altogether on that element: the trial as to
that element was conducted in the hearing rooms and floors of the
legislatures, or was effected by case-law development to which he was
not a party.
4. As a corollary to (3), the defendant was not allowed to confront
his "accusors."
5. The defendant may be punished, not as a result of all elements of
the crime having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but for not
having risen to his own defense, which, of course, is no crime.
Id. at 176. See also note 35, infra.
23State v. Sauls, 97 W. Va. 184, 194-95, 124 S.E. 670, 674 (1924).
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the mental capacity24 or chronological age' of the defendant should
weigh heavily in any consideration of the application of the deadly
weapons presumption.
In West Virginia, the court's treatment of "rebuttal" evidence
introduced by the defendant differs from the Thayer view. The court
does not speak in terms of rebuttal evidence presented by the de-
fendant. Instead, the court has stated that when the prosecution proves
the use of the deadly weapon, the jury should receive an instruction
as to the presumption of malice, unless the court determines that the
circumstances of the case do not warrant the insertion of the presump-
tion.26 Such circumstances have been held to be present where it
appears that the homicide was accidental, 27 was committed by one
without criminal capacity, 28 or was adequately provoked. 29 As a prac-
tical matter such evidence will be introduced by the defendant only
after the prosecution has presented its case, and if the defendant intro-
duces evidence of this type, the court must determine whether it is
sufficient to render the presumption "inapplicable." If the presumption
is rendered "inapplicable," the result is the same as "rebuttal" under
the Thayer approach, i.e., the presumption vanishes, and the instruc-
tion is not given. The operation of the deadly weapons presumption in
West Virginia appears to operate in essentially the same manner as
the Thayer view but through the use of differing concepts and terms.
24 State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S.E. 580 (1924). A stabbed B
after B twice called A a "vile and opprobrious epithet calculated to inflame the
human passion." There was strong evidence introduced raising the issue of
defendant's mental irresponsibility.25 State v. Vineyard, 81 W. Va. 98, 93 S.E. 1034 (1917). A, approximately
eleven years of age struck B in the stomach with a knife. B later died from the
wound. The court stated that, "when under age malice cannot lawfully be in-
ferred from the bare fact of cutting with a deadly weapon." Id. at 103, 93 SM.
at 1036.
26 State v. Cassim, 112 W. Va. 92, 163 S.E. 769 (1932); State v. Thornhill,
111 W. Va. 258, 161 SE. 431 (1931); State v. Laura, 93 W. Va. 250, 116
SE. 251 (1923); State v. Hurst, 93 W. Va. 222, 116 S.E. 248 (1923); State v.
Galford, 87 W. Va. 358, 105 S.E. 237 (1920).27 State v. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S.E. 996 (1896). A, who had been
drinking, went to his sister's house carrying a pistol. While A was toying with
the pistol, B told him to put it up, and during the process of putting the pistolback in his pocket the gun discharged, killing B.28 State v. Vineyard, 81 W. Va. 98, 93 S.E. 1034 (1917).
State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1, 52 S.E. 981 (1906). The court stated,
"a grievous provocation immediately resented with violence, resulting in death
reduces the offense from murder to manslaughter, is a rule of law, seems to be
asserted by all books." Id. at 3, 52 S.E. at 991. Accord, State v. Bowyer, 143
W. Va. 302, 101 S.E.2d 243 (1957); State v. Morris, 142 W. Va. 303, 95 S.E.2d
401 (1956); State v. Cassim, 112 W. Va. 92, 163 SE. 769 (1932); State v.
Thornhill, 111 W. Va. 258, 161 S.E. 431 (1931); State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va.
544, 123 SE. 580 (1924); State v. Laura, 93 W. Va. 250, 116 S.E. 251 (1923);
State v. Hurst, 93 W. Va. 222, 116 SE. 248 (1923); State v. Galford, 87 W. Va.
358, 105 S.E. 237 (1920).
[Vol. 75
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Under West Virginia law the jury is instructed that it may infer
malice from the use of a deadly weapon30 instead of being instructed
that it must infer malice, as the strict classical presumption would
require. This construction is similar to the California approach to
presumptions. Under this approach the jury is instructed that if it
believes certain facts to be true, the law permits them to find that the
presumed fact has also been proved, unless there is contrary evidence
that raises in their minds a reasonable doubt as to the truth or exis-
tence of the fact assumed.' The jury will naturally look to the de-
fendant to produce evidence tending to show the non-existence of
malice. If no evidence is presented by the defendant, the natural and
almost inevitable tendency is toward a finding of malice and a second
degree murder conviction.
It is for this reason that the West Virginia court requires the
instruction on the use of the presumption to refer to the facts pre-
sented by either the defense or the prosecution from which the jury
could find the presumption inapplicable.32 It is difficult to frame this
instruction so that the defendant is not prejudiced. Under the law of
West Virginia it would be proper for the court to give the following
hypothetical instruction:33
The court instructs the jury that if you believe from all the
evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant
with a deadly weapon, without any or upon slight provoca-
tion, gave to the deceased a mortal wound, then the jury
may infer malice from the use of the deadly weapon, and
unless the defendant proves extenuating or mitigating cir-
30 State v. Hamric, 151 W. Va. 1, 151 S.E.2d 252 (1967); State ex rel.
Combs v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d 115 (1966); State v. Toler, 129
W. Va. 575, 41 S.E.2d 85 (1946).
31 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIsION COMMISSION, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION
AND A STUDY RELATING TO TEE UNwom RULES or EVImENCE 1140 (1964).
California has by statute recognized the existence of both the Thayer and
Morgan views on presumptions. CAL. Evw. CODE 600-68 (West 1966). By
these statutes it has classified twenty-seven presumptions as (1) irrebuttable,
(2) transferring the burden of introducing evidence, or (3) transferring the
burden of persuasion. Comment, The California Evidence Code: Presumptions,
53 CALn. L. REv. 1439 (1965), presents an analysis of this approach to the
area of presumptions.32 State v. Sauls, 97 W. Va. 184, 195-96, 124 S.M. 670, 674 (1924). See
also State v. Garner, 97 W. Va. 222, 124 SM. 681 (1924); State v. Coleman,
96 W. Va. 544, 123 SE. 580 (1924).
3 This hypothetical instruction is based on an instruction in State v. Dean,
134 W. Va. 257, 58 S.E.2d 860 (1950). See Falknor, Notes on Presumptions,
15 WAsH. L. REv. 71 (1940); McCormick, What Shall the Judge Tell the Jury
About Presumptions?, 13 WAs. L. REv. 185 (1938); Morgan, Instructing the
Jury Upon Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 47 HIv. L. REv. 59 (1933).
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cumstances or such circumstances appear from the case
made by the State, then the defendant is guilty of second
degree murder.
By use of the above instruction the court specifically points out
the use of a deadly weapon while only generally commenting on any
mitigating facts or circumstances. The question arises whether the
court must point out each fact that may be used to mitigate or justify
the homicide, since it has specifically mentioned the use of a deadly
weapon and the inference of malice that may arise therefrom. To
require the court to determine and state each fact that might be used
as a mitigating fact, however, would be to carry the function of the
court beyond its limits and into the realm of the jury.1 Therefore, the
specific reference to the use of a deadly weapon, while only referring
generally to the mitigating facts or circumstances, should not be con-
sidered prejudicial to the defendant.
Since malice refers to the defendant's state of mind, the most
logical method of proving the non-existence of malice would seem to
be by the testimony of the defendant himself. In fact this is often the
only way in which the non-existence of malice can be shown. It is true
that the defendant is "entirely free to testify or not as he chooses;"35
but if the defendant has had prior criminal convictions, taking the
stand could jeopardize his chances of acquittal. Thus it may be proper
for the court to limit cross-examination where the presumption forces
the defendant to prove the non-existence of malice by his own testi-
mony.36 However, a limitation on the scope of cross-examination may
be only idealistic, since it appears next to impossible to develop any
standard to be used as a limitation when talking about such a nebulous
term as malice.
The practical effect of the deadly weapons presumption is to
place upon the defendant the burden of persuading the jury that
34 State v. Pietranton, 137 W. Va. 477, 72 S.E.2d 617 (1952). The court
stated: "In the trial of a criminal case the jurors, not the court, are the triers
of the facts, and the court should be extremely cautious not to intimate in any
manner, by word, tone, or demeanor, his opinion upon any fact in issue." Id. at
491, 72 S.E.2d at 624. See also State v. Peterson, 132 W. Va. 99, 51 S.E.2d 78
(1948); State v. Perkins, 130 W. Va. 708, 45 S.E.2d 17 (1947); State v. Price,
113 W. Va. 326, 167 S.E. 862 (1933); State v. Hively, 103 W. Va. 237, 136
S.E. 862 (1927); State v. Austin, 93 W. Va. 704, 117 S.E. 607 (1923).35Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925).36 Gainey v. United States, 380 U.S. 63, 87-88 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Justice Black determined that the effect of forcing one to testify against
himself is sufficient to render the operation of some presumptions unconstitu-
tional. Although Mr. Justice Black's discussion is about statutory presumptions,
the rationale can be applied to court created presumptions.
[Vol. 75
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malice is non-existent. The defendant is aided, however, by the re-
quirement that the instruction on the presumption includes a reference
to extenuating facts or circumstances which tend to justify or mitigate
the use of a deadly weapon. The jury remains the final arbiter on the
existence of malice. 7 It may choose to disregard the use of the deadly
weapon or infer malice from the use of the deadly weapon, depending
upon its reaction to all the evidence offered at the trial. Properly
applied, the defendant should not be prejudiced by the use of the
deadly weapons presumption, but its validity and effectiveness depend
ultimately upon each individual court and its discretion in applying
the presumption in each case.
John P. Carter
37 For a general discussion of "permissible" presumptions and the freedom
that is allowed the jury see C. McCoRMICK, supra note 13, at 802-05.
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